The importance of innovation for both society and organizations’ survival is widely accepted. In addtion, scientific management developed by Taylor in 1911 highlighted the relevance of measurement systems. Knowledge of both concepts evolved and improved during the 1900s, but benefits of joining them and creating a performance measurement system for innovation were first neglected, later questioned, and accepted only in the last decade. This chapter aims at providing the criteria and steps needed to set up a measurement system that helps to enhance innovation. The chapter is structured as follows: first, it discusses the evolution of performance measures for innovation. Second, it introduces strategy as leading the innovation measurement system, and the business model as the framework required to key metrics. Third, the chapter emphasizes the importance of cascading down this business model to the different organizational levels. Finally, it uses the Balanced Scorecard concept to design the measurement system because it covers both previous dimensions: the business model and its drill down.

The purpose of this work is to study on compensation packages for top management teams. The analysis focuses on the annual pay plus change in equity portfolio value, how its level, pay-performance sensibility and structure vary across managerial categories, and the impact of these variations on corporate performance. Using a multilevel mixed-model approach on 589 companies from the S&P 1500 between 1998 and 2005, the evidence shows that CEO compensation packages are not isomorphic to those of non-CEO executives, while on average no significant differences are found between divisional and corporate executives. Despite this, the random effects show that differences between two categories vary across companies, with shareholder return been lower for companies where differences between corporate and divisional managers are greater

The purpose of this work is to study on compensation packages for top management teams. The analysis focuses on the annual pay plus change in equity portfolio value, how its level, pay-performance sensibility and structure vary across managerial categories, and the impact of these variations on corporate performance. Using a multilevel mixed-model approach on 589 companies from the S&P 1500 between 1998 and 2005, the evidence shows that CEO compensation packages are not isomorphic to those of non-CEO executives, while on average no significant differences are found between divisional and corporate executives. Despite this, the random effects show that differences between two categories vary across companies, with shareholder return been lower for companies where differences between corporate and divisional managers are greater El propósito del presente trabajo es estudiar los paquetes de incentives para ejecutivos de la alta dirección. El análisis focaliza en el pago anual más el cambio en el valor del portafolio, cómo el valor, sensibilidad pago-performance y estructura de compensación varían a través de las categorías de ejecutivos, y la importancia de estas variaciones en la performance de la empresa. Aplicando un modelo de efectos mixto para datos anidados sobre 589 compañías del S&P 1500 entre los años 1998 y 2005, la evidencia muestra que los paquetes de compensación de los CEOs no son similares a los de otros ejecutivos, mientras en promedio no se detectan diferencias significativas entre ejecutivos divisionales y corporativos. A pesar de esto, los efectos aleatorios muestran que las diferencias entre estas categorías varían a través de las diferentes compañías, con el retorno para los accionistas siendo menor en compañías donde las diferencias entre ejecutivos corporativos y divisionales son mayores.