Some authors pointed to a realist orientation in Keynes’s thought. However, since “realism” is a wide, diffuse and sometimes equivocal term, one may ask, what kind of realism Keynes’s realism is. This paper argues that Keynes held to an ontological, logical-semantic and epistemic realism. Whereas ontological realism has metaphysical connections, logical-semantic realism involves a notion of truth and epistemological realism presupposes a theory of knowledge. The character of the subject-matter of knowledge circumscribes the scope of this last kind of realism. Epistemological realism is related to the role of intuition and convention in Keynes’s thought, the meaning and evolution of which is explained.

Reciprocity does not require exactness but only a certain equilibrium in the things reciprocated: it is often overabundant. In addition, reciprocity may be fulfilled by returning something of a different kind that may be heterogeneous and incommensurable with the thing received. The reason of this “uneven response” of reciprocity is that in these situations the exchange of means aims at manifesting some values that are ends for the persons involved. Hence, the consideration of reciprocity supposes a reinsertion of ends in economics. The paper firstly defines reciprocity. Next, it summarizes a variety of arguments for a reconsideration of ends in economics. After that, it explains the differences between the rationalities of means and ends. A key difference lies in the problem of incommensurability of ends. This problem will be then tackled and a possible way to overcome it will be proposed. It will be finally sustained that practical comparability allows for incommensurable fair reciprocation

La economía moderna se ha impuesto la presión de ser una ciencia exacta y por este motivo ha perdido realismo. Para conseguirlo ha puesto entre paréntesis los fines de la acción humana, que habían sido tenidos en cuenta desde Aristóteles a los economistas clásicos. Sin embargo, algunos economistas actuales han advertido los problemas que esto lleva consigo y han intentado recuperar la cuestión de los fines para la economía. Ahora bien, esta recuperación requiere un tratamiento metodológico adecuado de los fines. En este ámbito las comparaciones que implican cualquier decisión conllevan una serie de limitaciones. En este trabajo se expondrán estas dificultades y el modo de solucionarlas desde la filosofía de Aristóteles y de Santo Tomás de Aquino. Finalmente se apuntarán someramente algunas posibles consecuencias para la ciencia económica contemporánea. Modern Economics trying to be an exact science has lost realism. For the sake of exactness, it has put into brackets the aims of human action which had been considered from Aristotle to the classical economists. Some contemporary economists, however, have realized the problems of that isolating of aims and are trying to reconsider them. This rehabilitation of ends requires an appropriate methodology because the comparison of ends implies some difficulties. In this paper these difficulties are exposed and a way to solved them, relying on Aristotle and Aquinas, is proposed. Finally, some consequences for today Economics will be sketched.

A renewed concern with Aristotle’s thought about the economic aspects of human life and society can be observed. Aristotle dealt with the economic issues in his practical philosophy. He thus considered ‘the economic’ within an ethical and political frame. This vision is coherent with a specific ontology of ‘the economic’ according to Aristotle. In a recent paper, I analysed this ontology and left its consequences, especially for Ethics and Politics, for another paper. In this article, I firstly summarise the reasoning and conclusions of the aforementioned paper. Then, I extract the ethical and political “lessons” of the Aristotelian conception. I finally add a section with epistemological “lessons”, and consequences for the teaching of Economics.

This paper endeavours to summarise a variety of arguments for a reconsideration of ends in Economics. The logical structure of the rationality of ends (practical rationality) differs from the one of means (instrumental rationality). The paper sets out to explain the differences between both rationalities and some of the implications of incorporating this new emphasis on ends, given that Economics adopts the means rationality. The emergence of the topics of incommensurability and incomparability of ends is presented and a possible way to tackle it is suggested. Finally, some implications for Economics are drawn. This article emphasises the importance of incorporating practical rationality into economic analysis. The arguments of the paper are built on Aristotelian grounds.

Tony Lawson's and Uskali Mäki's respective realist projects rely on an ontology of the economy. This paper will not focus on these research projects but will instead try to shed light on them by introducing an ontology of the economy according to Aristotle. Oikonomiké, the seminal term used by him, is not a noun but an adjective. For Aristotle, nouns express entities or beings, both self-sufficient beings and accidental properties. Adjectives almost always express accidents. What kind of being is ‘the economic’? This analysis will suggest some conclusions about the constraints of economic science and the need for institutions according to the peculiar ontological condition of ‘the economic’ as conceived by Aristotle.

Conventional economic and management theories explain that business groups facing market liberalization policy reforms (i.e., competitive shocks) would have incentives to reduce corporate portfolios and increase internationalization. We empirically examine the strategic responses of Argentine business groups and, through an inductive theory building process, propose refinements to this theory. We argue that such a strategy process is moderated not only by differences in market forces set out by policy reforms across different economic segments but also by the path dependency of resources and capabilities as well as management decision-making style of individual business groups. We discuss implications for theory and practice.

La vida y las circunstancias de las personas inciden de algún modo en su pensamiento. En este trabajo se presenta la figura del economista inglés, seleccionando algunos rasgos de su personalidad y hechos de su vida y época, tomados especialmente de las biografías recientes. No se establecen las posibles conexiones con sus ideas, pero se presume que éstas surgirán naturalmente en los lectores que las conocen. Así se deja un amplio margen para que la "intentio lectoris" complete o suplante la "intentio auctoris".

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¿Es la educación la gran esperanza para hacer de la Argentina una nación con mejores personas, más adaptada a la sociedad del conocimiento, integrada al mundo con exportaciones de mayor valor agregado y, sobre todo, más equitativa? Por ahora esta es apenas la ilusión tranquilizadora con la que cierran los simposios, los debates políticos o las sobremesas de fin de semana. Ello ocurre porque, justo al revés de lo que debería ser, las escuelas a las que asisten los chicos más pobres son, en promedio, las peores. El desafío de la equidad educativa presenta un diagnóstico exhaustivo de esta realidad y formula propuestas concretas para lograr una mayor equidad educativa empezando por los más chicos y por los más pobres, centradas en el lema escuelas ricas para los pobres.

¿Por qué un libro sobre el pensamiento filosófico de Keynes? Porque su formación y actitud fueron principalmente filosóficas. Esta es para Ricardo Crespo la puerta de acceso al núcleo profundo del pensamiento económico y político keynesiano, que tanto ha influido en la historia de la economía de nuestro tiempo. Tras exponer los rasgos más característicos de la vida y personalidad de Keynes, el autor pasa a desentrañar sus ideas gnoseológicas, metafísicas, antropológicas, éticas y epistemológicas. Estas ideas inciden de modos decisivos en su visión de la economía. “Descubrir la melodía”, al decir de Keynes es penetrar lo esencial y aprender a manejarse de modo razonable en medio de la complejidad e incertidumbre propias de lo humano.

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Vivimos en sociedad y necesitamos de los bienes materiales, pero estos bienes no son absolutos sino mediatos y relativos. La sociedad participa también de la naturaleza espiritual, que tienen sus individuos, de donde se sigue que debe haber un equilibrio y jerarquía de fuerzas en pro del bien total del hombre, que a la vez es el mismo de la sociedad. Esta obra, del pensador señor Ricardo Crespo, expone la armonía de los actos humanos: de la economía en relación a la libertad y la responsabilidad del autodominio, de la sociedad con base en el bien común.

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In his Lives of the Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius depicts a very well known outline of Aristotle’s life and work, characterizing him as a morally good person. Diogenes transcribes Aristotle’s testament where he expressed his last will in a detailed way, taking care of his relatives, and freeing his slaves. This worry about all of them reflects the non ethereal character of his ethics which is firmly rooted and embedded in matter and time. Diogenes writes that Aristotle has taught that “virtue was not sufficient of itself to confer happiness; for that it had also need of the goods of the body, and of the external goods.” Hence, we should look after not only virtue but also these goods. According to Aristotle as quoted by Diogenes, “things which are ethical (…) concern politics, and economy, and laws.” In effect, Aristotle conceived economics as one of the practical sciences (epistèmè praktikè), which were the ethical sciences. For him, the highest practical science was politics, to which economics, as the other practical sciences, was subordinated.

La voz de la Enciclopedia editada por Robert Kolb referida a Kenneth Arrow primero hace una breve reseña de su vida y luego se concentra en la explicación del  teorema de la imposibilidad de Arrow y en sus aportes a la economía de la información.

En la voz "Escuela austríaca de economía" para esta Enciclopedia se presentan los oriígenes históricos, las características y los principales debates actuales de la correspondiente corriente de pensamiento económico.  

En la voz "virtud" de esta Enciclopedia se desarrolla la visión clásica de las virtudes morales e intelectuales, su origen en la historia del pensamiento, la conexión entre las virtudes y las posibilidades de la aplicación de una ética de las virtudes al mundo de los negocios.

 A growing body of literature has been concerned with the behavior and performance of business groups—that is conglomerates of legally independent companies operating in multiple markets but bound by financial and informal ties (Khanna and Rivkin 2001)—in the wake of ‘market liberalization policy reforms’ (e.g. Ghemawat and Kennedy 1999; Khanna and Palepu 1999, 2000a; Toulan 2002; Carrera et al. 2003). Such reforms—also known as competitive shocks (Ghemawat and Kennedy 1999: 847)—occurred across many emerging economies around the world as of the late 1980s, and most especially across Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru (Sachs and Warner 1995; Toulan 2002: 552); they involved both ‘external’ reforms, such as liberalization of foreign trade and Foreign Domestic Investments, as well as ‘internal’ reforms, such as liberalization of financial, inputs, and commodities markets (Ghemawat and Kennedy 1999). As these reforms caused shifts inmicroeconomic conditions, they enhanced competition among firms (Ghemawat and Kennedy 1999), and as a result, both the performance and behavior of business groups have been observed to change (e.g. Khanna and Palepu 1999; Carrera et al. 2003).

Suiza es actualmente la democracia más antigua que existe y cuenta con uno de los primeros sistemas federales del mundo. Parecería ser que esta forma de gobierno era la única capaz de armonizar las disparidades culturales, étnicas y religiosas que existían y existen en dicho país. Y lo que para muchos habría sido una desventaja, fue tomado como un desafío y transformado en una fortaleza. Entre las características institucionales más sobresalientes de este federalismo encontramos que existe una gran descentralización tanto del gasto como de la recaudación, junto con una amplia discrecionalidad de los niveles inferiores de gobierno. También es sorprendente el poder de decisión que tiene la población sobre las medidas que adopta el gobierno, ya sea a través de la democracia directa, practicada en muchas municipalidades, o a través de los referendums. Esto último ha contribuido a evitar una gran expansión del sector público, como ocurrió en otros países industrializados. Cabe destacar que la correspondencia fiscal es cercana a la unidad, lo cual, en un sistema tan descentralizado, implica que el ciudadano-votante- consumidor sabe qué es lo que está financiando con sus impuestos. Paga el impuesto a aquel nivel de gobierno que le provee el servicio, y las transferencias intergubernamentales tienen un papel secundario. El objetivo principal de éstas no es transferir recursos a otros niveles de gobierno, sino reducir la brecha entre las regiones con mayores ingresos y aquellas más pobres, es decir, un objetivo igualador. A pesar de la admiración que inevitablemente generan algunas de sus características, este sistema de federalismo fiscal no está exento de inconvenientes, muchos de los cuales son recurrentes en este tipo de gobiernos. Este trabajo analiza ambos aspectos del sistema suizo de federalismo fiscal, deteniéndose especialmente en los problemas que han surgido en las últimas décadas y también en las propuestas que han aparecido para revertir la situación.

This paper sustains that reappraising Austrian economics in the light of Aristotelian ideas is not only possible but also fruitful. First, I draw a sketch of the essential of Austrian economics. Next, I argue about the necessity for a thorough analysis of the notion of freedom, and I analyze Mises’ conception. Next, I expose Aristotle’s social, epistemological and economic thought related to Austrian main traits. An account of how the exercise of Aristotelian virtues may be synergic with economic coordination and a sketch of the consequences of the proposal on the teaching of economics are then provided. Finally, the conclusion shortly sums up the content and relevance of Aristotle’s contribution.

Nancy Cartwright combines elements from Aristotle, with others of Mill, and modern thinkers, as Elizabeth Anscombe and Ian Hacking, among others. This paper will address some tensions present in Cartwright’s thinking. It will propose that those problems might be overcome by a greater reliance on Aristotle and Anscombe’s thought. These tensions, the paper will argue, obey in part to her reliance on Mill. Cartwright understands scientific explanation in terms of stable causes, which she calls “capacities” or “natures”. Cartwright’s program aims at defining what capacities are (ontology), how they are known (epistemology), and how we use them. Cartwright opposes Hume’s reduction of causality to regularity of mere associations. Cartwright also opposes covering-law supporters because they do not consider causes; they merely include the so-“probed” singular case within a general covering law. Otherwise, Cartwright agrees with Mill’s proposal of “tendencies” which she identifies with her “capacities”. According to Cartwright, Mill’s tendencies are not tendencies of events but tendency factors or stable real causes. These tendencies or capacities may give rise to Cartwright’s so called “nomological machines”, stable configurations of components with determinate capacities properly shielded and repeatedly running. Cartwright’s proposal has been criticized in different ways. Margaret Morrison highlights first, a tension between the singular and universal aspects of capacities. Cartwright looks for a concept stronger and more general than Humean laws but she puts singular causes first. Second, Morrison also sees in Cartwright a conflict between her empiricism and capacities. For singular capacities to be stronger than Humean general laws supposes a metaphysical commitment that makes verification unnecessary. How could a person be empiricist and metaphysic at the same time? Finally, Morrison considers that Mill’s tendencies differ in important way from Cartwright’s capacities. Another point of criticism is her “local realism”, a disunified view of sciences. A final criticism is her skepticism about the possibility of explanation in social sciences. The paper will first analyze the Cartwright – Mill connection, then the Cartwright – Anscombe and finally the Cartwright – Aristotle connection. The tensions mentioned above will be solved by Cartwright’s arguments, based in Anscombe and Aristotle, and by complementary Aristotelian elements. The paper will also argue for the skepticism of Cartwright concerning a successful explanation in natural and (mostly) in social sciences. The problem of her interpretation of Mill will be tackled in the first section about the Cartwright – Mill connection. The problem of the tension singularism-universalism, will appear in the section about the Cartwright – Anscombe connection. The tension empiricism-metaphysics, and the problem of her disunified view of science, in the section about the Cartwright – Aristotle connection. This last section will also include an Aristotelian account and development of the statements of Cartwright concerning social sciences. Thus, the conclusion will be that there is still much we can learn from Aristotle with respect to economics and social theory.

As characterized by Fehr and Gachter (2000), “reciprocity means that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self interest model.” According to S. Zamagni, reciprocity entails deep relational aspects. A may reciprocate B in a way that is not comparable to economic exchange. A would keep certain equilibrium in reciprocating. However, reciprocity does not require this equilibrium to be necessarily exact; it is often overabundant. In addition, reciprocity may be fulfilled by returning something of a different kind that may be heterogeneous and incommensurable with the thing received. Sometimes it means that A gives to B with the expectation that B will give something to C, and that the chain will go on, and in some way finally return to A. This does not occur always or necessarily. The reason of this uneven response of reciprocity is that in these situations an exchange of means is not only in play, but also the ends of the persons are. Hence, the consideration of reciprocity in economics is in line with the considerations of ends in economics, recently rehabilitated by the capabilities approaches and the theories of happiness. This paper firstly endeavours to summarise a variety of arguments for a reconsideration of ends in economics. This line of enquiry hints at a considerable challenge to economic science. The logical structure of the rationality of ends (practical rationality) differs from the one of means (instrumental rationality). The paper intends secondly to explain the differences between both rationalities and some of the consequences of incorporating this new emphasis on ends. Practical rationality harmonizes the complex set of constitutive ends in order to achieve a plan. This plan, however, is not perfectly designed: people must deal with the future, the complexity and the singularity of situations. All these conditions turn plans incomplete, uncertain, and underspecified. Human time, rationality and freedom open the practical realm. Consequently, the relation among these elements (different levels of ends and means) is dynamic involving shifting elements. Notwithstanding, there is a general unspecified final end and a preliminary plan or draught of components of the yearned happy life: material conditions, family-life, friendship, social-life, professional development, culture, art, religion, political and economic freedom, among others. These ends are simultaneously sought in themselves and as means to reach a final end. The instrumental character of these ends and of means should not be confused. Ends are not interchangeable conditions but constitutive parts that are also valuable in themselves. A key resulting difference between both logics and rationalities – i.e. instrumental and practical rationalities – lies in the problem of incommensurability of ends which emerges in the second kind of rationality. This problem that will thirdly be tackled in the paper turns illegitimate the use of maximization in the realm of ends. I hence propose that there is a possible way to overcome this problem, different from the one that an economist might have instinctively adopted. In such cases, making a decision should depend on practical comparability, not on the commensuration of ends: the result is not exact but it is the only feasible and sensible one sometimes. In addition, this procedure is not irrational. The paper will finally sustain that practical comparability allows for incommensurable fair reciprocation.    

The structure of these closing remarks is as follows. In the first part I present a selection of some of the propositions presented and discussed during the XIII Plenary Session. They can help the reader to perceive the speech universe of this very important session. In the second part I suggest that an integral development agenda is needed to give proper answers to the immense challenges posed by this new phase of globalization, plenty of hopes, but also plenty of threats.

 The subject of this XIII plenary session is the relations between different peoples and nations, the developed and the developing, the emerging and the poor, from the point of view of the virtues of charity and justice. We will ask ourselves whether these relations, in the light of the social Magisterium of the Church, can become more just, fairer, and more peaceful, and what the route should be to achieve such ends. In other words, is a partnership for charity and justice possible in the globalized world? In order to help us to fulfill these goals the purpose of this Introduction is twofold. The first part, that is backward looking, presents a very brief synthesis of the previous work of the Academy on globalization. The second part looks, instead, to the present and to the future, as it is focused on the identification of the new signs of the times that we should cautiously read in order to assess if they contribute or impede an improved effectiveness of charity and justice in the relations among peoples and nations at the beginning of this new millennium.

El presente trabajo analiza la evolución de los retornos a la educación superior en Argentina durante el período 1974–2002 y cómo se vieron afectados por el desempleo. Se encontró que dichos retornos son mayores si se los corrige teniendo en cuenta el nivel de desempleo para cada nivel de educación. En consecuencia, al evaluar la decisión de invertir en educación no se debería considerar como beneficio simplemente el diferencial de ingresos sino también la mayor probabilidad de tener un trabajo. Este análisis es particularmente relevante en Argentina, que pasó de tener tasas de desempleo cercanas a 5% durante la década del ochenta a tener tasas de dos dígitos a fines del siglo XX y comienzos del siglo XXI.

El trabajo conjunto de estos académicos permitió el desarrollo de un nuevo enfoque de la economía política, estrechamente vinculado con las otras ciencias sociales. De hecho se reintroduce la consideración de los fines en la economía. Aunque no se menciona la expresión "derecho natural", parecería que esos fines son postulados como tales principios. Esta ponencia pretende presentar el tema, mostrar las diferencias entre los planteos de Sen y Nussbaum y sugerir una hipótesis acerca del carácter y origen de las capacidades propuestas como fines de la economía por estos autores.

Este trabajo se titula “Las racionalidades de la economía”, usando el número plural del sustantivo racionalidad, por dos motivos. El primero, porque se argumenta a favor de un doble tipo de racionalidad aplicable a la economía, la instrumental y la práctica. El segundo motivo es porque hoy día se postulan varias propuestas en torno a la racionalidad en economía, tales como las expressive rationality, situated rationality, ecological rationality, achievement rationality, background rationality, constitutive rationality, que procuran ir más allá de las diversas versiones de la racionalidad tradicionales: la elección racional, la racionalidad limitada y la teoría de juegos. En general estas nuevas propuestas tienden a buscar una ampliación del concepto de racionalidad. La aspiración de algunos de estos proyectos es encontrar un concepto que supere la forma de racionalidad denominada instrumental. No siempre lo logran. El trabajo consta de dos partes: en la primera se expone el marco de las racionalidades de la economía en el primer sentido: las racionalidades que rigen la realidad económica y la ciencia que las estudia. En la segunda se reseñan las nuevas posturas.